THE DILEMMA OF ELECTORAL FREEBIES IN INDIA: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

सार

As one of the largest constitutional democracies in the world, India offers a distinctive opportunity to examine how electoral practices interact with constitutional governance. The increasing reliance on electoral freebies in India has generated serious constitutional, legal, and fiscal concerns. Popularly described as “revdi culture,” the practice involves political parties promising or distributing material benefits to voters, often funded through public money, to secure electoral support. While welfare schemes form a legitimate part of India’s constitutional framework, the unregulated expansion of freebies raises questions about free and fair elections, misuse of public funds, and long-term economic sustainability. This paper critically examines electoral freebies through constitutional provisions, statutory frameworks, landmark judicial decisions, and institutional responses. It analyses the limitations of existing election laws, particularly the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Model Code of Conduct, and the restricted powers of the Election Commission of India. The paper further explores the evolving judicial discourse, economic implications highlighted by expert institutions, and the urgent need for legal reform. It concludes by proposing a balanced framework that reconciles welfare objectives with fiscal discipline and constitutional accountability.